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FUNDS TRANSFER OPERATIONS:
BOON OR BANE TO THE VIABILITY OF RURAL
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES?*
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Introduction
Financial intermediaries are supposed to have two arms, One arm is
used to raise funds from surplus units, and the other, to allocate funds to
credit-worthy and more productive borrowers. In the Philippines, past
financial policies had largely contributed to the creation of incomplete or
"one-arm" rural financial intermediaries (RFI).1 In particular, the sub-
sidized credit programs of the government made it very profitable for RFIs
to function merely as conduits of government funds. The failure of these
credit programs are well-documented. 2 Their main side-effect is that they
retarded the development of the savings mobilization function of RFIs.
With the recent withdrawal of subsidized credit programs and the
switch in policy towards greater reliance on market forces, the availability
of formal credit to the rural, agricultural sector has been greatly reduced/
RFIs are then expected to mobilize more savings to fill in at least the void
left behind by the withdrawal of such subsidized funds. This approach
recognizes the fact that savings can be mobilized even in low-income
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Policy Council (ACPC). Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), and Ohio State
University (OSU), The project was coordinated by Dr. Mario B, Lamberte (PIDS) and Dr. V.
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I. RFIs include rural-based branches of commercial banks, private develop-
ment banks and unit banks.
2. For example, see Sacay etal(1988).
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communities. 4 The objectiveof this new set of policiesisto encourage
the emergenceofa trulyviableRFIswithfullydevelopedsavings mobiliza-
tionandlendingfunctions.OnlyviableRFIscangenuinelycontribute to a
sustainedincreaseinthe flowof credittothe ruralareas.
Savingsmobilization appearsto bea notso difficult taskofRFIs.With
a liberalinterestrate policy,a remarkablerisein ruraldepositshasbeen
noted.5 However,this hasnot been matchedby a risein creditto rural
areas.As notedby Lamberte(1987),branchesof commercialbanksand
privatedevelopmentbankshavetransferredmostof the funds mobilized
in ruralareas to their respectivehead officeslocated in Metro Manila.
Thus,we are leftagainwith incompleteRFIs,onlythistime,theirlending
functionisnotwell-developed. 6 Thisoutcomeclearlyundermines one of
theobjectivesof pushingformalfinancialinstitutions intoruralareas.
Sofar, the policyresponseof the governmentin reversing the flowof
Ioanablefundsinfavor ofthe ruralarasisto maintain the agricultural loan
quotaand depositretentionpolicies. 7 However,theseschemesdirectly
runcountertothe policyof creatingtrulyviableRFIs.Thereis,therefore,a
need to rethinkthe entireapproachto developingtrulyviableRFIs.As a
firststep,the behaviorof banksmustbewell understood.Inthis particular
case, there is a need to study the funds transfer operations of bank
branches.
The specific questionsthis paperaimsto answerare:
1) What is the structureof fundstransferopeationsof rural-based
branchesof banks?Isitfromone branchto another?. Or isitfrom
onebranchtothe headoffice?
2) Whatfactorsdeterminethe volumeof fundstransferredfrom one
branchtoanotherofthe samebank?.
3) What is the impact of funds transfer operations on the savings
mobilization effortsof rural-basedfinancial intermediaries?
Thenext section discussessometheoretical considerationsregarding
funds transfer operations and savings mobilization. Section III presents
4. See Lambertoand Bunda(1988).
5. See Blanceand Meyer (1988).
6. The reasonswhyRFIs prefernottolendto ruralareasare discussedin
Laparand Graham(1988), Magnoand Meyer (1988), and Untalanand Cuevas(1988).
7. The formerstipulatesthatbanksallocate 10percentoftheirnetIoanable
fundstoagrarianreformbeneficiariesand 15percentforgeneralagricultural lending,while
the latterrequiresbanksto invest75 percentoftheirtotaldepositsinthe sameservice
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some empirical results which draw heavilyon Relampagos(1988). Some
policy implicationsare discussed inthe lastsection.
Funds Transfer Operations and Savings Mobilization:
Some Theoretical Considerations
In the rural areas, the seasonalityof economic activity is clearly
visible. It is important to recognize this feature since it implies a certain
pattern in the flow of resources. For example, in predominantly rice-
producing areas,demand for working capital by farm-households sharply
rises during planting season, while excess funds are being accumulated
during harvest season.8 In the absence of formal financial institutions in
the rural areas, farmers source credit from the ICMs during planting
season. At harvest season, they pay their debts. Whatever is left after
provision for home consumption is kept either in cash or in physical as-
sets(e.g.radios,camera, andothers)which canbesoldor rnodgagedwhen
planting season comes to augment their working capital. Although these
forms of savings yield low returns, stillfarmers hang on to them because
of the absence of more attractive savingsinstruments.9
Any bank that operates in the rural areashasto squarely-dealwith the
seasonability of economic activity. The implication of this seasonality on
the flow of funds of a particular bank situated in a town isdepicted in
Figure 1.Although there are other economic activities in this town, it isas-
sumed that one agricultural economic activity, say rice farming,
dominates. Of course, this is not an unrealisticassumption as one scans
the rural landscape of the country. It isfurther assumed that there aretwo
planting and harvest seasons per year. Inevitably, the pattern of the
demandfor credit experienced by the bank in this town follows that of the
dominant economic activity,lo
The presence of a bank in a town provides saverswith an alternative
form of saving. It isassumed herethat the characteristics of these savings
instruments (i.e. yield, risk, liquidity, etc.) are better than cash or physical
assets. Although the savings pattern of households/individuals in a par-
ticular town may be heterogeneous,11 the existence of a dominant
economic activity implies an aggregate pattern of saving dominated by
those who are engaged in the dominant economic activity. This is also
shown in Figure 1.
8. Forempiricalsupport,see TBAC (1981).
9. Inthecaseofcash,anypositive inflationrateyieldsnegativereturn.Inthecase
ofphysicalassets,thecostinvolvedin liquifying themcouldbe high.
10. Not_ that the demandfor credithere refers onlyt_ those of credit-worthy
borrowersas perceivedby the bank. Fora discussiononthe stages indeterminingcredit-
worthyborrowers,see I_aDar and Graham_(1988).
11. See Meyerand Alicbusan(1988).: : : i :_iii i ii ::: ::: ¸ ..... : _ : : _ _ :_ ::
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During planting season, the bank is likely to experience heavy
withdrawals ofdeposits, while during harvest season,a surge in deposits.
In both situations, a bank is confronted with a liquidity problem; that is, it
is highly illiquid during planting season and too liquid during harvest
season.Since its Ioanablefunds are low during planting season,the bank
cannot meet all the demand for credit, thereby foregoing profitable earn-
ing opportunities.Any increasein the interest ratewill likely havevery min-
imal impact on deposits since the dominant savers are withdrawing their
deposits this period. On the other hand, during harvest season where
demand for credit isvery low, the bank will find itself holding costly idle
balances, Thus, the entire situation poses great difficulty on a bank to
operate viably in atown.
One of the ways to deal with this situation isto activatea funds trans-
fer operation.12This is only possible among banks which have branches
elsewherewhose patternsin the flow of funds areinverselyCorrelatedwith
at leastone other branch. Thus,a bank situated ina ruralarea may be a
net receiveror supplierof funds depending onthe season.
A situation may, however, arisewherein a branch bank located in a
rural areaisa net supplier of fundsthroughout the year.This isdepicted in
Figure 2. This bank is known to have a structural liquidity problem as
opposedtothe.tempora'-7liquidityproblem shownin Figure1.Thesavings
mobilization effort of this bank can only be sustainedif excessfunds can
betransferred to deficit branches more profitably than lending them out to
the sameservicearea.
Indeed, funds transfer operations are a bank-wide activity involving
the participation of the head office and its branches with a common ob-
jective to maximize global profits through better allocation of financial
resources from surplus to deficit branches. In some areas, especially
those which are overbranched, the deposit market of a particular branch
may not be sufficient enough to cope with the demand for credit and,
thus, through funds transfer operations the branch can utilize the surplus
funds of other branches. In this situation, the deficit branch can avoid
sourcing funds from the external money market which may be relatively
more expensivethan if the funds were mobilizedthrough deposits or per-
haps, resorting to credit rationing when externalfunds cannot be obtained
at all to meet anyexcess demand. Through internalor managementarran-
12. Rediscounting with the Central Bank is another way out. We will not highlight
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gements with regard to the use and transfer of financial resources among
units, the bank as a whole can minimizethe cost of production by possib-
ly loweringthe expenses incurred in sourcing bank funds.
In other words, fundstransfer operations can be viewed by branch
banks as a resources management system responding to policies and
procedures designed to obtain more deposits and to allocate them more
efficiently to alternative uses.Almost all managersinterviewed in branches
of commercial banks recognized the significant contribution that funds
transfer operations made to the profitability of the bank as a whole.
Whether or not a bank specifically perceivesthis fact, it isclear that the ul-
timate goal isto maximize profitthrough optimal allocation of funds.
Major Findings
Datafrom this study were obtained from the ComparativeBank Study
Questionnaire which was administered to a sample of rural financial in-
stitutions consisting of 38 branches of commercial and private,develop-
ment banks and 28 unit banks.13 Almost.all unit banks are rural banks
(seeAnnex). Discussion on funds transfer operations will be limited only
to rural-based branchesof commercialand privatedevelopmentbanks in-
cluded in the sample.
Generally, the trend of funds flow is from branches operating in the
ruralareasto the urban-basedheadoffices, specificallythe.NationalCapi-
tal Region (seeTable 1). Over 80 percent of the total commercial bank
(KB)sample transferred excessfunds to their head offices located in the
Metropolitan Manila area in 1986 This implies that rural-based branches
of commercial banks are a potential source of funds by the headoffices.
On.the other hand, 73 percent of the total private development bank
(PDB)sample transferred funds to their head offices in the sameyear. At
the same time, however, majority of the PDB branches received funds
from their head offices, which makesit inconclusive to say that PDBsare
funding most of the time the lendingoperations of the mother branch.The
figuresindicate that 94 percent ofthe KBsare surplus branchesasagainst
60 percentof the PDBs.
Thereis a concentration of branchesof commercial banks that trans-
ferred funds to.other units with amounts greater than P1 million but not
more than P100 million in 1986 (see Table 2). Thirteen branches trans-
ferred funds to their urban-based headoffices with the exception of one
branch which moved funds not only to its head office but to other
13. See Lamberte (1988) for a detailed discussion on sampling design for the study
and a description of the contents of the Comparative Bank Study Questionnaire,96 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 1
DIRECTION OF FUNDS FLOW, 1986
Type of Bank
Direction Total %
KBs % PDBs %
From sample branch to:
Head Office (HO) 21 80.8 8 72.7 29 78.4
Regional Office (RO) 1 3.8 1 9.1 2 5.4
Other Branches (OB) - - 1 9.1 1 2.7
HO and OB 1 3.8 1 9.1 2 5.4
HO, RO, and OB 1 3.8 - - 1 2.7
Did not transfer 2 7.7 - - 2 5.4
Total 26 100.00 11 100.00 37 100.00
To sample branch from:
Head Office (HO) 6 23.1 7 63.6 13 35.1
Regional Office (RO) 1 3.8 - - 1 2.1
Other Branches (OB) 2 7.7 1 9.1 3 8.1
Did not receive 17 65.4 3 27.3 20 54.0
Total 26 100.00 11 100.00 37 100.00
Source'. Relampagos (1988),RELAMPAGOS and LAMBERTE: FUNDS TRANSFER 97
Table 2
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE VALUE OF TRANSFERS,




KBs % PDBs %
< 0 1 5.6 4 40 5 17.9
> 0 - 1M - - 1 10 1 3.6
> 1M - 50 M 8 44.4 3 30 11 39.3
> 50M - 100M 5 27.8 1 10 6 21.4
> 100M - 500M 3 16.7 1 10 4 14.3
> 500M 1 5.6 - - 1 3.6
TOTAL 18 100.00 10 100.00 28 100.00
Mean 100,929,926 60,142,400 86,362,552
S.D. 151,138,208 142,420,384 146,764,248
Median 46,604,500 18,097,222 37,030,248
Missing Obs. KB = 9 PDB = 1 ALL = 10
Source: Relampagos (1988).98 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
branches as well. However, out of these 13 branches, three received
funds from the head office, and two from other branches during the same
period. Thus, eight branches made gross transfers to the head offices
while five branches made net transfers.
On the other hand, almost one-half of sample PDB branches trans*
ferred funds to other units with amounts ranging from P1 million-P100
million. Two of these branches made net transfers to the head office, one
branch made gross transfer to the head office, and another one, to the
regional office. Four other PDB branches received funds from the head of-
fice.Thus, there were more PDB branches that were recipients of head of-
rice funds compared to KBs.
There is no significant difference in the averagevalues of funds that
surplus branches of KBs and PDBs transferred to the head office and
other units. The average value of funds transferred is Pl10,411,369 and
P108,543,856 for KBs and PDBs, respectively. However, there is a sig-
nificant difference between the average values of funds received by deficit
branches of KBs and PDBs from the head office and other units:
P60,266,000 for KBs and P12,459,793 for PDBs. This is due to the fact that
almost all KB loans are fully bank-funded while PDB loans, on the other
hand, are partly government-funded (i.e., special credit programs) or
Central Bank-funded (i.e., rediscounting windows). Moreover, this finding
suggests that KBs are capable of handling bigger loans than PDBs.
In general, as shown in Table 2, the average value of transfers for KBs
is 68 percent higher than that of PDBs. Moreover, 94 percent of the KB
sample are surplus branches compared to only 60 percent of the PDB
sample.
Funds may flow directly or indirectly from branches to the head office.
For branches located in the Visayas and Mindanao regions, surplus funds
are chanelled to the area/regional office which, in turn, moves the funds to
the head office. But for branches operating in areas near the head office,
excess funds can be transferred directly to the head office through an ar-
mored vehicle. Figure 3 shows these two alternatives.
One-third of the branch managers who were interviewed considered
the poor viable loan demand in rural areas as one reason why their
branches accumulated excess balances. This perception is due to the fact
that bank branches prefer to accommodate large loans, while most
production loan requirements in the rural areas are small. This is reflected
in the relatively high minimum loan size requirement imposed by bank
branches. Branches of commercial banks and private development banks
have required minimum loan sizes averaging P104,057 and P182,318,
respectively (see Table 3). Enforcement of this minimum loan size require-
ment definitely disqualifies small borrowers. This requirement suggests
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Table 3
MINIMUM LOAN SIZE REQUIREMENT AND LOAN CEILINGS






Mean 604,545 2,461,111 1,143,548
S.D. 479,560 2,478,882 1,591,683
Median 500,000 1,000,000 800,000
2. Minimum Loan
Size Requirement
Mean 104,057 182,318 127,324
S.D. 140,369 207,336 164,131
Median 51,750 100,000 100,000
Source: Relampagos (1988).RELAMPAGOS and LAMBERTE: FUNDS TRANSFER 101
where large borrowers engage in large agri-business,manufacturing and
trading operations.
Other branch managers claimed that the transfer of surplus funds to
the head office is done to comply with bank management policies. It is
within this context that branch managers perceive funds transfer opera-
tions as a standard operating procedure (SOP),whereby all excessfunds
accumulated by the branchesare automatically channeledto the head of-
rice. Fifty percentof the sample KBbranch managers,asagainst nine per-
cent of the sample PDB branch managers, emphasized this reason.
Implied in this resultis the control in the decision-making functions of the
branches with regard to the use of the financial resources being mobi-
lized.The findings show that KB branches are more regualted than PDB
branches. Theabove conclusion iscorroborated by anotherfinding which
shows that the head offices of KBs determine the amount of transfers
whereas the branch officers of private development banks make that
determination.
PDBs have relatively higher authority level than KBs. The average
value for the loan ceiling is P2,461,111for PDBs compared to only
P604,545for KBs.It can be concluded from the foregoing resultsthat the
discretionary power of branches in granting loans is more restricted in
KBsthan in PDBs.
Funds transfer operations have also some favorable effects on the
deposit-taking activity of a branch faced with an excessdemand for credit
in the service area. From the deposit interest rate and the transfer pool
ratedata, the average pure cost of deposit funds for both banks, 6.5 per-
cent for KBs and 9.0 percent for PDBs, is significantly lower than the
averagetransfer pool rate for both banks, 14.1 percent for KBsand 13.0
percent for PDBs(seeTable4). This means,therefore, that as long as the
branch can extract deposit funds from the local savers, it can readily
transferthem to other branches ata profit.
Data on net transfers on a quarterly basis in 1986were obtained from
four bank branches. These are presented in Figures4 - 7 together with
the quarterly outstanding deposits and loans of the same banks. Several
observations can be made from these figures. First,almost all banks ex-
perienceda modest rise indeposits during the year.Thisisan indicationof
the intensification of their savings mobilization effort and the favorable
response of the rural households. Secondly, seasonality has a more
visible effect ondeposits than on loans.This suggeststhat bank branches
in the rural areasare catering more to the non-agricultural sector whose
demand for credit is less sensitive to seasonalitythan to the agricultural
sector, while they secure a greater proportion of their deposits from farm
households. And, lastly, some bank branches are net funds suppliers at
certain seasons and net funds receivers at other seasons of the year.102 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 4
TRANSFER POOL RATES AND INTEREST RATES, ON SAVINGS AND
TIME DEPOSITS, BY BANK TYPE, 1986





Mean 14.1 12.0 13.8
S.D. 2.3 3.1 2.6
Median 13.7 13.0 13.7
2. Deposit interest
Rates
Mean 6.5 9.0 7.2
S.D. 1.6 2.0 2.0
Median 6.7 9.6 7.3
Source: Relampagos (1988).:b:£>£::'_::<:: :_ >£
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These are bank branches which are encountering temporary liquidity
problem. Other banks are consistently net fund suppliers throughout the
year.Thesearethe bankswhichhavestructuralliquidityproblem. Thefunds
transfer operations musthave sustainedtheir viability.
What factors determine the volume of funds transferred from one
branch to another, or vice versa? It is hypothesized that the following fac-
tors havean effect onthe volume of funds transferred/received by branch
banks:




4) maximum loan sizerequirement;
5) collateral-loanratio; and
6) loan defaultrate.
The decision of a branch to transfer (or borrow) funds to (from)
another branch is determinedby the lending rates,transfer pool ratesand
deposit rates. Ifthe transfer pool rateis higher relativeto the lending rate,
then the branch would choose to transfer the funds to the head office
rather than extendthem as loans in its service area. Onthe other hand,a
higher lending rate relative to the transfer pool rate would make lending
more attractive, hencethe availability of funds that can be transferred is
reduced. Thus, it is hypothesized that the amount of transfers is positively
correlated with the transfer pool rate,and negativelycorrelated with the
lending rate. On the deposit side, it is hypothesized that the amount of
transfers and the deposit interest ratesmove in the samedirection. A high
deposit rate offered to depositors would increase the volume of deposit
fundsmobilized.Consequently,the availabilityof funds that can betrans-
ferredwill increase.
Transactions cost on lending is a major factor considered by banks in
processing loan applications. It is hypothesized that high transactions
cost on lending induce "selective" lending behavior among branches of
KBs and PDBs which, eventually would lead to the creation of surplus
funds.
The maximum-amount-per-loan ceiling is one way of regulating the
branch's decision-making power in approving loan applications so as to
limit its lending activities.Thus,this could result in the creation of surplus106 JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
funds among branches.The hypothesisto be tested hereisthat a higher
maximum-amount-per-loanceiling would reduce the amount of funds that
a branch cantransfer to other branches,and vice versa.
A branch may require a certain minimum amount of loan per bor-
rower. Some banks do this in order to cover at least the fixed overhead
costs involved in processing loan documents regardless of the loan
amount applied for. Thus,this requirementhas the objective of choosing
those borrowers whose value of loan applied for is at least equal to the
minimum loan size. Thus, it is hypothesized that a higher minimum loan
requirement creates more surplus funds in the branches, and thus, in-
creasestheamount of fundsto betransferred,and vice-versa.
High collateral-loan ratio is expected to reduce loan defaults. This
also screensout small borrowers who cannot meet the collateral-loan re- -
quirement. It is hypothesized that there exists a relationship between the
collateral-loan ratio and the amount of funds transferred by the branch.
Therelationship, however,cannot bedetermineda priori. A positive effect
ofthe ratio on the volume offunds transferredwould meanthat a highcol-
lateral-loanratio reducesthe number of borrowerswho can meetthe col-
lateral requirementwhich eventuallyleads to more surplusfunds. On the
other hand, a negative effect meansthat higher collateral-loan ratio en-
courages the bank to lend more because risk is reduced with the col-
lateral.Hence, theamount of funds to betransferredwill decline.
There are other factors that influence the volume of funds trans-
ferred/received, One example is the loan default rate. However, insuffi-
cientdata havedeterred us from including them inthe model.
Themodelto betested is summarizedas follows:
TF = f(rD,rT,rE,TCL,LC, ML,C/L)
where
TF -- amountof fundstransferred/received;
rD -- weightedaverageinterest ratesonsavings
andtime deposits;
rT -- transfer pool rate;
rL -- weightedaveragelending ratesofall types of loans;
TCL -- cost per peso loan outstanding;
LC -- maximum-amount-per-loanceiling;
ML -- minimum loan size requirement;and
C/L -- collateral-loan ratio.
In the empirical model, the ratio of net transfers to total deposits in
1986 is used as the dependent variable. This is a more appropriate vari- .
able than the volume of funds transferred since it portrays the extent ofRELAMPAGOSand LAMBERTE: FUNDS TRANSFER 107
funds transfer operations.Also, the ratioof transfer pool rate to lending
rate is used as one independent variable rather than treating them
separatelyin the model. Dataon the cost per peso loan outstanding were
obtained from Untalanand Cuevas (1988).The restof the datawere taken
directly from the Comparative BankStudy SurveyQuestionnaire.
Table 5 shows three regression runs in logarithmic form. These are
the best among several models tested. Except for the variables minimum
loan size requirement and maximum-amount-per-loanceiling in Model I,
all other variables yielded the expected signs. Thetransfer pool rate-loan
rate ratio exhibits a highly significant effect on the net transfer-to-deposit
ratioinallmodels. This impliesthat thetransfer pool rateispositivelyrelated
or, similarly,the loan rate isnegatively related,to the amountof transfers.
Another variable which has a highly significant effect on the dependent
variable in all models is the cost-per-peso loan outstanding. Resultsug-
gests that as the transaction costs of lending go up, banks tend to reduce
their lending, thereby increasing the available funds that can be trans-
ferred. Lastin the seriesof variableswhich have significant effectsonthe
dependent variableistheweightedaveragedepositrates.Theresultshows
thata highdepositrateofferedto saversincreases the volumeof deposit
funds mobilizedwhich, in turn, increasesexcess fundsthat could be
transferred.
The collateral-loanratio has the expected sign, althoughnot sig-
nificant inModelsIandII. InModelIII,afterdropping thevariablescollateral-
loanratioand minimumloansizerequirement, the maximum-amount-per-
loanceilingvariableobtainedthecorrectsign,althoughstillnotstatistically
significant. Thedummyvariableinallrunshasasignificant coefficient which
meansthat PDBshave highernettransfersrelativeto depositsthanKBs.
Lastly,the F-statisticsof all modelsare significantat one percentlevel
implying a strongstatistical relationship betweenthe explanatoryvariables
andthe dependentvariable.
Table6 showsthe regression runsin logarithmic formof the deposit
mobilizationmodel. This model includeboth branch banks and unit
banks.In Model I, a dummyvariableisincludedwithvalueszerofor unit




In Model II,the transferpoolrateisused.Thisvariablewas nottrans-
formed intonaturallog sincea zerovalueisassignedin eachof the unit
banks.The resultobtainedhere issimilarto the previousresultwhen a
dummyvariableis used.Thetransferpoolratecoefficientispositiveand
significant at one percentlevel.It is importantto notethat the transfer
poolrateinthiscaseactsas a dummyvariable.Thatiswhythe resultsof108 JOURNAL OF PH{LIPPINE [3EVELOPMENT
Table 5
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE VOLUME
OF FUNDS TRANSFERRED,ALL BANKS, 1986
_lllJ
Variable Model I Model II Model III
Constant 6.312 - 0.968 7.009
(0.451) (-0,105) (0.781)
Transfer pool rate-
to-lending rate 10.376 7.586 8.297
ratio (3.576)*** (3.466)*** (3.231)***
Weighted average
deposit rates 2,609 4,580 4.209
(0.982) (2.311)** (1.807)*
Cost-per-peso loan
outstanding 1.130 1_047 0.933
(2.944)** (3,044)*** (2.700)**
Collateral-loan ratio - 1.323 - 1,327 -
(-0.942) (- 1,049) -
Minimum loan size
requirement - 0.317 - 0.001 -
(-0.451) (-0.001) -
Maximum-amount-per-
loan ceiling 0.155 - -0.529
(0.214) _- (--0.872)
Dummy - 4.546 - 3.192 - 4.171
0 = PDB (-2.710)** (-2.698)** (-2.749)***
1 =KB
_2 0.671 0.649 0.604
F-Stat 5.672*** 7.175-*- 6.789***
Note:
(1) Dependent variable: Net transfers-to-total deposits ratio
(2) Figures in parentheses are the t-statistic, * significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%,
(3) Not all the sample banks are included in the regression runs because of the ab-
sence of information in some of the variables included inthe model. Model I =
17 obs.; Model II = 21 obs.; Model III = 20 obs.
Source: Relampagos (1988).RELAMPAGOS and LAMBERTE: FUNDS TRANSFER 109
Table 6
REGRESSION RESULTS, DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION MODEL,
ALL BANKS, 1986
Variable Model I Model iI
Constant - 4.366 - 4.026
(- 1.667)* (- 1.608)
Weighted average
deposit rates 0.266 0.254
(0.532) (0.517)
Loan rates 0.915 0.815
(1.346) (1.243)
Transfer pool rates - 0.067
- (3.019)-**
Dummy variable 0.985 -
0 = unit banks (2.937)....




(a) Dependent variable: Total deposits - total assets ratio
(b) No. of observation: 45
(c) Figures in parentheses are the t-statistic. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Relampagos (1988),110 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
the two models are basically the same. Implied in the results is the
favorable effect of the funds transfer operations on the deposit mobiliza-
tion efforts of the branches of commercial banks and private development
banks. Thus, branch banks tend to mobilize more deposits than unit
banks in the same service area partly because of the availability of funds
transfer mechanism.
Policy Implications
The results of the study show how branches of commercial banks and
private development banks deal with the problem of operating in rural-
areas where most borrowers are considered less credit-worthy and where
small loans are deemed unprofitable. The funds transfer operations of the
branch banking system allow banks to efficiently allocate bank-wide
resources from surplusto deficit branches.
The benefit from funds transfer operations is that it serves as an im-
petus for branches of commercial banks and private development banks
to intensify their efforts to mobilize rural savings. Regardless of the
seasonality of funds flow in rural areas, branches are not worried about
having possible outlets for deposit funds since they Can always resort to
moving them to other branches faced with high level of demand for credit
in their service areas. The reverse istrue in the case of deficit branches.
The major contributions of funds transfer operations among commer-
cial banks and private development banks should therefore be considered
in the formulation of policies aimed at improving the present situation of
the rural sector. Most important of all, policymakers shouldaim for greater
consistency between the rural-agricultural policies and various govern*
merit programs which call on financial intermediaries to extend their
operations in the rural areas. The bottom line isthat with the withdrawal of
subsidized credit programs, RFIs have to be viable first.
In light of the results of this study, certain government policies need to
be re-examined. Specifically, the deposit retention scheme directly works
against the objective of banks, especially in the branch banking system,
to maximize profit or net returns on present cash flows through better al-
location of financial resources from surplus to deficit branches. It is under-
standable that the government aims to increase the flow of credit to the
rural-agricultural sector, but this should not be accomplished at the ex-
pense of the viability of banks. Whenever RFIs experience temporary li-
quidity problem, i.e., they are highly liquid at one season and illiquid at
another season, or structural liquidity problem, i.e., they have excess li-
quidity throughout the period, then they should be allowed to direct funds
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That most bank branches in the rural areas transferred their excess funds
to the urban centers is an open invitation to fine tune policies so as to ef-
fect economy-wide structural changes. Thus, trade, price and fiscal
policies that are biased against rural economic activities thereby making
them unprofitable need to be reconsidered. This, together with the
removal of the deposit retention policy and the introduction of a more
liberal branching policy, can attract more banks to expand their banking
services in the rural areas.
The deposit retention scheme, if it perpetuates, may also work against
the efforts of banks to mobilize rural savings. Compelling banks to invest
75 percent of their total deposit resources in the same service area is tan-
tamount to saying that even less worthy projects will be financed by
banks to meet the required investment qouta. This may alter the percep-
tion of banks to intensify their deposit-taking efforts if they cannot obtain
attractive returns from their investment undertakings. One shortcoming of
this scheme, therefore, is the inefficient use of deposit funds over time as
banks may forego a better alternative investment option in other areas
which could have earned them higher net returns. One of the groups of
losers would be the surplus units who will not be offered by banks attrac-
tive interest rates on deposits.
The absence of funds transfer operations in the unit banking system
should be considered seriously in framing up government policies which
aim to increase credit supply in the rural-agricultural sector and, at the
same time, to ensure the viability of these rural-based financial institutions.
Perhaps, the appropriate policy here is to encourage unit banks to
strengthen linkages among themselves and/or with branches of KBs and
PDBs in other areas to effect interbank funds transfer operations. How-
ever, the agri/agra requirement and deposit retention policies impede
such development. Also, the single borrower's limit which is set at 15 per-
cent of the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus can hinder' unit banks
with excess funds from lending to deficit unit banks or branch banks, as
the case may be. Thus, removing such restrictive banking policies to allow
unit banks to effect funds transfer would greatly benefit them. 14
Finally, the development of non-agricultural economic activities in the
rural areas should be seriously pursued. Here, aside from appropriate
trade and price facilities, the provision of rural infrastructures, such as
electricity, good roads, adequate port facilities, communication, etc., can
raise the profitability of rural-based, non-agricultural micro-enterprises.
14. However, the single borrower limit to non-bank borrowers should be retained.112 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
With a broader economic base having heterogeneouscash flow patterns,
the seasonality of economic activities would be inconsequential to the
viability of RFIs. In this regard, the current thinking, which is gaining
popularity among lawmakers,of requiring banks to lend at least3 percent
of their Ioanable funds to micro-enterprises is certainly a retrogression.
Ironically, this comes at a time when support for the removal of the
agri/agra requirement is rapidly growing. The experience of this country
as well as of other countrieswith loan portfolio regulations should be con-
sidered in formulating laws and policies. It is said that history repeats it-
self. But this is not a natural law. This happens only when men refuse to
learnfrom experience.RELAMPAGOS and LAMBERTE: FUNDS TRANSFER 113
ANNEX A
Sample
The targetted 66 banks were selected from the following provinces:
Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Laguna, Batangas, Camarines Sur, Iloilo,
Negros Oriental, and Misamis Oriental. These are classified below ac-
cording to types of banks.
Classification of Sample Banks
Type Number Percentage
Branch Banks
(1) KBs 27 40.9
(2) PDBs 11 16.7
Unit Banks
(1) RBs 23 34.8
(2) PDBs 5 7.6
Total 66 100.0RELAMPAGOS and LAMBERTE: FUNDS TRANSFER 115
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